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expand manual prospect intelligence workflows

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Marco0300
2026-09-02 17:57:17 +02:00
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## Current safety boundary
- **Automated outreach is disabled.** The compose file sets `AUTOMATED_OUTREACH_ENABLED=false` for both services. The MVP sends no email, SMS, or other outbound communication.
- **Automated outreach is disabled.** The Compose file sets `AUTOMATED_OUTREACH_ENABLED=false` for both services. The MVP sends no email, SMS, or other outbound communication.
- Phase 3 intelligence is **manual and provenance-first**. Operators enter child intelligence/evidence records; the platform does not perform automated prospect discovery, DNS resolution, website/HTTP scanning, or external enrichment.
- Every business, child record, note, pipeline transition, and audit/activity read or write must be constrained to the authenticated user's organization. A child identifier must never bypass the parent/tenant check. Cross-tenant misses should be indistinguishable from an absent record.
- Evidence provenance (source reference/label, captured or observed time, actor, and confidence where supported) is data lineage, not proof that the platform independently verified the source. Do not fabricate provenance or silently upgrade an observation to a verified fact.
- List and child-record APIs use bounded pagination and server-side filters. Bounds must be enforced before query execution and filters must be combined with the tenant predicate; never use client-side filtering as an authorization control.
- Pipeline and notes are collaboration metadata. A reviewed pipeline state does not authorize contact, and suppression takes precedence over every other state. Audit entries should capture actor, tenant, target, action, timestamp, and safe details without secrets or unnecessary contact data.
- No credentials are committed. `.env.example` contains non-secret names and local defaults only.
- Authentication uses server-side sessions for browser clients. The session identifier is carried in an `HttpOnly` cookie; logout/revocation must invalidate the server-side session. Health endpoints are deliberately public and must remain usable without a session.
- Containers run as an unprivileged user, drop Linux capabilities, use `no-new-privileges`, and use read-only root filesystems. The API data volume is the only intended writable persistent location.
- The stdlib API remains a small MVP security boundary. Authentication/session handling does not by itself provide authorization, CSRF protection, rate limiting, MFA, or a complete audit log.
## Known limitations before production
1. **Password storage:** production passwords must be hashed with Argon2id using a reviewed cost/memory/parallelism policy. Never store plaintext or reversible passwords, and never log bootstrap credentials. Rehash on login when the policy changes.
2. **MFA:** require phishing-resistant or TOTP MFA for administrator accounts in production, including the bootstrap admin before granting ongoing administrative access. Define recovery, enrollment, reset, and revocation procedures; do not treat a password-only bootstrap as production-ready.
3. **Authentication and authorization:** enforce authorization server-side on every protected route, rotate/regenerate sessions at login and privilege changes, expire idle/absolute sessions, revoke on logout/password reset, and test tenant isolation. The bootstrap variables are one-time provisioning inputs, not a standing authentication mechanism.
4. **Cookies and CSRF:** use `HttpOnly`, `Secure` (production HTTPS), and an appropriate `SameSite` policy. `Secure` cookies cannot be exercised over the local HTTP Compose URLs, and `SameSite` is defense-in-depth—not a complete CSRF control. Browser state-changing endpoints require CSRF tokens (or a rigorously reviewed equivalent); do not rely on CORS or cookie flags alone.
5. **SSRF:** any future URL fetcher must allow only `http`/`https`, validate DNS/IP targets, block loopback/private/link-local/cloud-metadata ranges after resolution, limit redirects, enforce size/time limits, and re-check each redirect. Never fetch arbitrary user-provided URLs from the server without these controls.
6. **Input/output safety:** validate schema and content types, bound request sizes, parameterize database queries, escape output, and avoid logging contact data or secrets.
7. **Secrets:** inject production secrets from a secret manager or orchestrator secret store. Do not place them in images, Compose files, source, CI logs, or committed `.env` files. Remove bootstrap variables after first-run provisioning.
8. **Transport and perimeter:** terminate TLS at a trusted ingress, restrict exposed ports, add network policy, and place admin surfaces behind appropriate access controls.
9. **Data protection:** define retention and deletion rules for prospect/contact data, restrict volume access, encrypt backups, and maintain an access/audit trail.
3. **Authentication and authorization:** enforce authorization server-side on every protected route, including every child-record, note, pipeline, and audit route. Rotate/regenerate sessions at login and privilege changes, expire idle/absolute sessions, revoke on logout/password reset, and test tenant isolation.
4. **Cookies and CSRF:** use `HttpOnly`, `Secure` (production HTTPS), and an appropriate `SameSite` policy. Browser state-changing endpoints require CSRF tokens (or a rigorously reviewed equivalent); do not rely on CORS or cookie flags alone.
5. **SSRF and future scanners:** no scanner is enabled in this release. If a future approved feature fetches a URL, allow only `http`/`https`, validate DNS/IP targets, block loopback/private/link-local/cloud-metadata ranges after resolution, limit redirects, enforce size/time limits, and re-check each redirect.
6. **Input/output safety:** validate schema and content types, bound request and note/evidence sizes, parameterize database queries, escape output, and reject unsafe provenance URLs or markup. Treat operator-entered notes and sources as untrusted data.
7. **Audit and retention:** the current audit/activity behavior is an MVP trail, not an immutable compliance log. Define append-only guarantees, retention, redaction/deletion rules, access controls, alerting, and export procedures before production.
8. **Secrets:** inject production secrets from a secret manager or orchestrator secret store. Do not place them in images, Compose files, source, CI logs, or committed `.env` files. Remove bootstrap variables after first-run provisioning.
9. **Transport and perimeter:** terminate TLS at a trusted ingress, restrict exposed ports, add network policy, and place admin surfaces behind appropriate access controls.
10. **Data protection:** define retention and deletion rules for prospect/contact data and provenance, restrict volume access, encrypt backups, and maintain a tested access/audit trail.
## Source and contact policy
Treat discovered business information as potentially personal or copyrighted data. Collect only what is needed for the documented product purpose, preserve source attribution where required, respect site terms and robots/access policies, and provide suppression/deletion handling. Do not infer consent to contact from public availability. Any future outreach feature requires an explicit product/legal review and must remain off by default.
Treat manually supplied business information, notes, and source references as potentially personal or copyrighted data. Collect only what is needed for the documented product purpose, preserve source attribution where required, respect site terms and robots/access policies, and provide suppression/deletion handling. Do not infer consent to contact from public availability or a reviewed pipeline state. Any future outreach or discovery feature requires explicit product/legal and security review and must remain off by default.
## CI/dependency hygiene
Pin or review base-image and dependency updates, scan images before release, use least-privilege GitHub tokens, and avoid printing environment values. CI may validate Compose with empty optional bootstrap variables and call unauthenticated health checks; it is not a substitute for Argon2id parameter review, MFA testing, or a security assessment.
Pin or review base-image and dependency updates, scan images before release, use least-privilege GitHub tokens, and avoid printing environment values. CI may validate Compose with empty optional bootstrap variables and call unauthenticated health checks; it is not a substitute for authorization/tenant-isolation tests, provenance policy review, Argon2id parameter review, MFA testing, or a security assessment.
Report vulnerabilities privately to the repository maintainers; do not include live credentials or personal data in an issue.